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The unexpectedly good performance of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party 
in the December 1993 Russian parliamentary elections intensified debates inside 
Russia and in the West about the unpredictable nature of the country's politics and 
strengthened the argument of those who hold the view that Boris Yel'tsin's team could 
soon be replaced by an extreme nationalist government. It has been argued that a new 
constitution, also adopted in December 1993, that gives almost unlimited powers to the 
president could be used by an extreme nationalist leader of Zhirinovsky's type to revive 
strict and effective authoritarian rule in Russia.(1)
Those speaking about unpredictability in Russia's politics could point to the weakness of 
the country's political parties, its poorly developed political institutions,(2) corruption, 
and socially disruptive economic changes. All these are reminiscent of the situation in 
modernizing countries in Latin America and Asia, where military coups and other violent 
upheavals are common. To the surprise of many observers, however, this year in 
Russia has been marked by trends towards increasing stability compared to 1993. The 
signing of the Civic Accord in April 1994 by Yel'tsin, other top government and state 
officials, politicians (including a number from opposition movements), and 
representatives of Russia's republics and regions, was the first time Russia's elite 
groups met in an attempt to forge a consensus since the communist system started to 
collapse. The new parliament, despite the high number of extreme politicians among its 
members, is on the whole more ready to cooperate with the executive than the old 
parliament had ever been. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's talent for working with 
a variety of political groups has a stabilizing influence. In 1994, Moscow's regional 
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policies have shown increased effectiveness. The signing in February 1994 of the 
Treaty on the Delimitation of Spheres of Authority and the Mutual Delimitation of Powers 
by Russia and Tatarstan considerably reduced the likelihood of Russia's disintegration.
The questions of how long this stability can last and by what means this stability has 
been achieved naturally arise. It seems that the current stabilization owes much to the 
revival of traditional governing methods, which has entailed the abandonment of many 
earlier democratic experiments:
• First, the role of appointed officials has increased. With few exceptions, Russia's 
governors (i.e., the heads of regional and local administrations) and city mayors 
are appointed either by the president in Moscow or by top regional executives and 
are thus not accountable to the population. Moreover, as stipulated by the new 
constitution, the role of those executive organs has increased at the expense of 
legislative bodies at all levels; the regional and local legislatures now play virtually 
no meaningful role in politics.(3)
• Second, the president, with all his powers, relies less on the government than on 
parallel and largely unconstitutional bodies within the presidential apparatus. The 
period following the December 1993 parliamentary elections and constitutional 
referendum witnessed "a substantial increase in the number of officials and 
organizations shielded from independent oversight and responsible only to the 
president."(4) Among the changes introduced by the president following the 
adoption of the new constitution were, for instance, the abolition of the Security 
Ministry and the creation instead of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, 
directly subordinated to the president, to assume most of the ministry's functions. 
Furthermore, most legislative initiatives still come from the president in the form of 
presidential decrees, sometimes contradicting the constitution. This does not 
enhance the rule of law in the country, especially since many of the decrees are 
ignored both in Moscow and in the periphery.
• Third, in practice, Moscow's regional policies are not aimed at federalizing the 
country. In violation of the main principle of federalism, the new constitution allows 
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the powers of regional governments to be unilaterally changed by Moscow. Current 
regional policies are producing a situation similar to that in Russia before the 
February Revolution of 1917: a unitary state incorporating autonomous ethnic 
territories with broader powers of self-government. The current status of Tatarstan, 
for example, can be compared to that of Finland in Tsarist Russia in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries.(5) Some observers argue that Russia's republics and 
regions have acquired enormous powers to manage their own affairs. While it is 
true that several are far more powerful than before, many of their powers have no 
legal basis and, as Yel'tsin's decrees disbanding regional and local legislatures in 
the fall of 1993 have shown, could be curtailed by Moscow.
• Fourth, attempts to revive the prestige of the army through official propaganda as 
well as its role in politics are increasing. Already in 1992 official media and 
members of the government began to refer to the army as one of the main pillars 
of Russian society (the other being the Russian Orthodox Church). Simultaneously, 
in late 1992, the army's role in implementing Russia's policies in the successor 
states to the USSR drastically increased. It is largely through the army that the 
Russian government is trying to assure Russia's influence and even presence in 
most parts of the former Soviet Union.(6)
Moreover, Yel'tsin is now in debt to Defense Minister Pavel Grachev for his support 
during the August 1991 putsch and the October 1993 disturbances, and there is 
ample evidence that the latter's wishes carry a lot of weight in the decision-making 
in Moscow. For instance, the president and the government are now trying to 
suppress a discussion in the media of corruption in the armed forces.(7) This new 
role of the army reduces the chances of its revolt due to frustration. However, this 
role, which is highly politicized, should be a source of concern to a government 
proclaiming democratization as its goal.
• Fifth, neo-imperialist policies are gaining ground. Since 1992, Yel'tsin's leadership 
has condoned or promoted Russian military intervention in Moldova and a number 
of newly independent states in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, taken a "tough 
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line" on the treatment of Russian minorities in the Baltic States, and exerted 
economic and other pressure on Ukraine in an attempt to appease the opposition, 
which is alarmed by the loss of Russia's status as an empire. Those policies are 
also aimed at boosting the current leadership's rapidly waning prestige with the 
public and at reasserting Russia's role as a great power in the international 
community. Leading politicians, including Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, justify 
their demands for Russia's special role on the territory of the former USSR by 
referring to the Russians who, since the 16th century, sacrificed their lives to bring 
the region from the Baltic Sea to Central Asia under Russian control.(8)
• Sixth, not only Russia's pre-Revolutionary but also Soviet traditions are being 
glorified. To cite just one example, this year's celebrations of the Soviet Union's 
victory in World War II were accompanied by uncritical praise on state-run 
television and in other media of Russia's role in "liberating" Europe from fascism. 
Controversial aspects of Soviet policies during the war, widely discussed during the 
Gorbachev era, were largely ignored. In the words of John W. R. Lepingwell:
 
While the intelligentsia debates the meaning of "Russia," ... that identity is being created 
in an ad hoc fashion, partly because of the transformations in society and partly 
because of political expediency. The result is an odd, and perhaps, unstable, amalgam 
of the Russian past and the Soviet legacy.(9) 
All those developments may well be inevitable at this stage. Until recently, the 
legitimacy of Russia's first postcommunist government was based almost entirely on 
Yel'tsin as a charismatic leader. Now that his popularity is declining, other forms of 
legitimacy must be found. It would have been surprising if the current leadership--largely  
a prisoner of its communist past--had done other than attempt to revive elements of the 
Russian/Soviet tradition.
But while those policies have brought a degree of short-term stability, they do not tackle 
the roots of the problems and are thus unlikely to have positive results in the long term. 
Indeed, the current stability is strikingly fragile. Although the new constitution gives the 
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president almost unlimited powers, Yel'tsin seems weak and indecisive. Yet there is no 
clear alternative to him in the democratic camp. The State Duma has been slow in 
adopting laws, thus hampering economic reform, and the brief period of economic 
stabilization appears to be coming to an end. Relations between the federal government 
and the periphery are still not clearly defined, and the leaders of a number of ethnic 
republics have stated that they will not abandon the sovereignty they had de facto 
acquired by late 1993, regardless of what the new constitution says.(10) The 
deterioration in relations between Moscow and Chechnya in the summer and fall of 
1994 and between North Ossetia and Ingushetia in November 1994(11) highlights once 
again the center's inability to deal with crises on its periphery. Few of those problems 
are likely to be solved by relying on past practices and traditions.
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